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Abstract 
 
Emerging in recent research on socio-technical transitions towards a low carbon economy is the 
question of the extent to which such transitions require centralised, intentional coordination by 
government. Drawing from F.A.Hayek‟s conceptualisation of coordination, this paper evaluates the 
effectiveness of policy for low and zero carbon homes in England. A detailed analysis is presented of 
how policy makers address complex choices and trade-offs, as well as significant uncertainty. 
Particular attention is given to those policy decisions which are widely agreed by stakeholders to 
cause distortive effects. The focus here on the impacts of policy definition and delivery in terms of 
multiple evaluative criteria can complement and enrich the more process-orientated cross-sector and 
multi-level analyses that predominate in existing research on policy coordination. Furthermore, the 
coordination problems identified yield further insights into the actual and potential effectiveness of 
policy processes in shaping complex socio-technical transitions. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Research on socio-technical transitions in general, including the growing literature on 
transitions to a low carbon economy (Elzen et al., 2004), offers important insights into how 
technological innovations are shaped by their wider social, economic and political contexts. 
In this literature, states are understood to have a potentially coordinative role in facilitating 
transitions (Kemp et al., 2007). An emerging question is the extent to which such 
coordination needs to involve centralised, intentional decision-making and planning  (Smith 
et al., 2005; Walker and Shove, 2007, p. 1492). „Transition management‟ theorists emphasise 
the need for coordination at the national, as well as regional and local levels (Kemp et al., 
2007; Rotmans et al., 1999).  Yet their understanding of coordination has been criticised as 
being „teleological‟ in character, not capturing the plurality of different ways in which 
transition goals might be achieved (Berkhout et al., 2004).  
This paper focuses upon this emerging issue of the effectiveness of governance and policy in 
facilitating coordination during processes of transition in the face of complexity and 
uncertainty. This issue is explored through a case study of the U.K. zero carbon homes 
agenda in England. The analytical approach applied here draws particularly from F.A. 
Hayek's conceptualisation of coordination problems as essentially epistemological in 
character. It is argued that Hayek‟s work formulates important questions about the capacity of 
governments to address problems of coordination, a closer focus on which can complement 
and enrich current approaches in transitions research. By applying this approach, several 
effects of policy for low and zero carbon homes are identified which are widely agreed to be 
„distortive.‟ However, the conclusion drawn is that, contrary to the Hayekian thesis, there are 
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strong grounds for supposing that the cause of these problems are institution-specific and that 
there is significant scope for political and policy processes to address the coordinative 
challenges involved in the governance of transitions towards sustainable development.  
The analytical approach applied here for evaluating the effectiveness of policy, as further 
explained in section 2 below, includes detailed analysis of stakeholder framings of policy and 
its impacts. The case study is introduced in Section 3, with the detailed findings, including 
several examples of problems of policy coordination, being presented in section 4. Section 5 
briefly sets out insights yielded by this research into some of the causes of these problems. 
2. The Problem of Coordination 
 
The transitions literature is primarily concerned with understanding the range of social factors 
that shape processes of innovation. There is a particular interest in understanding the 
interactions between innovation across the three different „levels‟ defined by Rip and Kemp 
(1998) in their multi-level model as: (i) socio-technical „regimes,‟ (consisting of production 
practices embedded in particular institutions and infrastructures), (ii) the „landscape‟ within 
which these regimes emerge (structural trends such as cultural norms and socio-economic 
developments) and (iii) technological „niches‟ (defined as micro level spaces). The literature 
also includes reflection on how to facilitate coordination in the governance of transitions. 
There is a focus on the approach of transition management theorists who developed the multi-
level model and whose proposals have been adopted by the Dutch government. On their 
view, it is the role of government to facilitate the development of “guiding visions” 
containing the long-term objectives for a transition and the formulation of interim objectives 
for moving towards achieving this. Another key element of the approach is „strategic niche 
management‟ (Kemp et al., 1998), in which governments provide some initial protection for 
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emerging „niche‟ technologies to enable them to be tested and become established to some 
degree.  
Transition management theorists highlight the complexity and uncertainty involved in 
defining and achieving transition objectives and emphasise the importance of drawing from 
the perspectives of a wide variety of actors. Yet the approach has been criticised for having a 
teleological character (p.53), underestimating the plurality of ways in which transitions can 
be achieved (Berkhout et al., 2004). This critique also highlights the uncertainty and 
difficulties involved in establishing the viability and desirability of these visions. Rather than 
being dominated by rational action, it is suggested that transitions involve technological 
choices which are inevitably value-laden and hence open to political contestation. This, it is 
suggested creates problems for such attempts at steering transitions (Berkhout et al., 2004, 
pp. 57-59). 
The concepts of policy “integration” and coordination have been a more explicit subject of 
inquiry in some research on governance for sustainable development (Jordan and Lenschow, 
2010; Lafferty and Hovden, 2003). This research agenda is, in significant part, a response to 
the stated EU commitment to „Environmental Policy Integration‟ (EPI). The focus is 
primarily on „vertical‟ integration (the implementation of policy objectives across different 
tiers of responsibility within a particular policy sector) and „horizontal‟ forms integration (the 
extent to which a cross-sectoral policy strategy has been developed (e.g. Lafferty and 
Hovden, 2003). Discussions of the concept of EPI refer to the early definition of Underdal 
(1980) for whom EPI entails a need to consider a comprehensive range of potential policy 
outcomes. However, the focus of research has been on process-orientated criteria for 
assessing horizontal and vertical coordination (e.g. Jordan and Schout, 2006; Lenschow, 
2002; Nilsson and Persson, 2003). There is much less of a focus on the substantive impacts of 
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policy decisions in terms of the various evaluative criteria requiring consideration, as is the 
focus here. 
Although widely known, the Hayekian thesis, and indeed the Austrian tradition in political 
economy from which it emerged, receives relatively little attention in the literature on 
governance for sustainable development in general and socio-technical transitions in 
particular
1
. Hayek conceptualises the problem of coordination as an essentially 
epistemological one of ensuring that individuals are able to act on the basis of information 
about the technical and economic possibilities open to them, whilst taking into account the 
preferences and actions of others (Kirzner, 2000, p. 136). Hayek emphasises that markets 
facilitate coordination in this sense through a decentralised process involving continual 
innovation.
2
 His work anticipates recent debates about transitions management, including a 
critique of centralised, instrumentalist approaches to planning. There is even a sense in 
which, by emphasising that choices between technologies are shaped by socially-determined 
perceptions, norms and purposes and involve significant uncertainty, his work anticipates the 
recent postpositivist turn in the social sciences (this author, 2010). He stresses the 
inextricable connection between the plurality of individual purposes, norms, or „ends‟ and the 
most suitable technological means for achieving those ends. These choices are, therefore, 
essentially „economic‟ in character (Hayek, 1948, pp. 77-86; 121-123). Again reflecting the 
Austrian economics tradition, he recognises that the different ends motivating individuals are 
not reducible to monetary measurement (Hayek, 1944, p. 69). Hence Hayek can be taken to 
understand „economic‟ choices in a broader sense that can incorporate non-monetary values 
and criteria (this author 2006). Economic complexity, for Hayek, is also shaped by the 
variegated, spatially dispersed and subjective character of knowledge concerning complex 
                                                          
1
 A contribution to the debate by John Meadowcroft is a significant exception (Meadowcroft, 1999) 
2
 Hayek’s thesis is developed through his debates with socialists on economic calculation (Hayek, 1948) and 
further elaborated in his subsequent famous works (Hayek, 1944; Hayek, 1960; Hayek, 1982a). 
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economic choices and trade-offs (Hayek, 1948, p. 77). Economic knowledge is also 
emphasised to be characterised by continual change, being shaped by ongoing processes of 
innovation in technologies and consumer goods (Hayek, 1935; Hayek, 1949, p. 82).  
Markets are, Hayek argues, an indispensable mechanism for facilitating coordination in the 
face of complexity because they perform two closely related, yet conceptually distinct, 
coordinative functions (this author 2007b). Firstly, the prices generated by markets 
encapsulate, in a simple numerical form, highly complex, indispensable information about 
demand and supply in the economy (See Hayek, 1982b, pp. 116-118). This information, he 
notes, is often locally situated and can be difficult to formally define. Hence, he argues, the 
decentralised, distributed nature of markets means that they are especially well suited to 
capturing this. Prices also serve as a guide enabling producers and consumers to discover new 
economic knowledge in the face of continually changing economic circumstances and 
associated uncertainty (Hayek, 1978). Hayek acknowledges that markets do not reach optimal 
outcomes (Hayek, 1948, p. 101). His point is that they are able to fulfil coordinative functions 
in a way that cannot be achieved by centralised planning.  
Hayek's critique of government planning is directed not only to non-market central planning 
systems such as that of Soviet Russia but also to social democratic proposals for a mixed 
economy in which governments seek to intervene in markets in order to secure particular 
economic outcomes. Hayek‟s objection to such proposals is that government intervention will 
inevitably fail to capture important information about the productive potential and impacts of 
different technologies, especially when considered in terms of the „ends‟ of different 
individuals and groups across society. Hence, from a Hayekian perspective, the problems of 
„unintended consequences,‟ which have since been the subject of much discussion in policy 
analysis, are an inevitable result of such a mixed model of political economy (Hayek, 1944, 
p. 31).  
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Yet, even Hayekian proposals for market-based solutions to externality problems such as 
environmental pollution and degradation, as forwarded more recently by „free market 
environmentalists,‟ entail a significant role for the state in defining the scope of markets. 
Defining property rights in a way that is conducive to ecological protection involves complex 
political choices, especially in the face of issues of such a profound scale and cross-cutting 
character as climate change (Meadowcroft, 1999); this author, 2007). Hence, the question that 
emerges from reflection on the Hayekian pro-market thesis is the same as has emerged in the 
transitions literature: what should be the nature and scope of the role of the state in 
facilitating coordination? 
Hayek‟s work has been criticised for neglecting the significant potential of the political 
sphere to address problems of coordination (Gamble, 1996; Meadowcroft, 1999). Non-market 
forms of coordination are possible, such as through dialogue amongst policy-makers and the 
insights provided by various kinds of experts (this author 2010). Assessment methods 
designed to take into account non-monetary criteria (this author 2008), some of which are 
measured by social and bio-physical indices, also perform a coordinative function by 
encapsulating complex information. Nonetheless, Hayek‟s work raises the interesting 
question of the capacity of non-market, political processes to fulfil the dual coordinative 
functions of knowledge encapsulation and discovery (this author 2010; 2011).  
Of course, the potential epistemological problems which Hayek particularly emphasises, are 
not the only ones facing the political sphere in seeking to facilitate transitions towards more 
sustainable forms of development. A further challenge is to create the incentives for policy 
actors which encourage a coordinated approach. And not all problems arising in the political 
sphere can be understood as problems of coordination, as there might be significant, perhaps 
irreconcilable, differences between the values of stakeholders. In the case of low and zero 
carbon housing, for example, the priorities of an environmental organisation such as WWF 
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can be expected to differ markedly from those of most housing developers. Nonetheless, as 
the Hayekian perspective suggests, the process of forming goals and assessing and 
discovering concrete means of translating them into practice are closely intertwined. Hence, 
analysis of coordination problems as conceptualised by Hayek offers the promise of yielding 
new kinds of insights into the nature and scope of the plurality of normative ends across 
society.  
Such an analytical focus demands careful attention to the substantive content of policy and its 
impacts, as well as the process-orientated focus of existing literature on socio-technical 
transitions and policy integration. Here, the effectiveness of policy in facilitating coordination 
is assessed through a comparative analysis of how different stakeholders frame the issue. The 
starting point for the analysis, following the recent „postpostivist‟ turn in science and 
technology studies, is a recognition of the contestable, often normatively-laden character of 
these „framings.‟ As Smith and Stirling (2007) argue in their discussion of low carbon 
transitions, such a starting point does not in itself exclude the possibility of evaluating these 
perspectives. They allude to the possibility of a reflexive awareness of multiple perspectives 
being combined with an “objectification” or “fixing” of knowledge concerning socio-
technical systems (Smith and Stirling, 2007, pp. 369-370). Such a process can be taken, as it 
will here, to provide a degree of objectivity on which to base such evaluative analysis.  
In the analysis below, policy decisions are considered to have given rise to coordination 
problems if, according to the views of a significant proportion of stakeholders: (i) they have 
failed to capture significant information about „economic‟ dimensions of complexity 
(understood in the broad sense introduced above that incorporates non-monetary criteria) and 
(ii) as a result, policy does not effectively reflect overall policy priorities as stated by leading 
policy-makers. In other words, to borrow a phrase from economists, they consider policy to 
have a „distortive‟ effect on the decisions of practitioners. In order to ensure that such 
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distortive effects are captured by the research, the analysis undertaken includes a detailed 
focus on how stakeholder framings understand and address the potentially complex economic 
dimensions of choice involved in the transition to a low carbon economy. Identifying these 
„distortive effects‟ will enable subsequent reflection on their causes and exploration of the 
Hayekian thesis that problems of coordination are an inevitable outcome of governmental 
intervention in the market. 
3. Introducing a case study of policy for low and zero carbon homes 
 
In December 2006 the U.K. Labour government established the ambitious, „world leading‟ 
target (ARUP, 2009) for England that, by 2016, all newly built homes will be „zero carbon.‟3 
This was an important example of government seeking to substantively shape market 
outcomes in the face of profound market externality problems, particularly that of climate 
change. Yet the Labour government also emphasised that this ambition would be addressed in 
a way consistent with maintaining economic competitiveness (DCLG, 2006, p. 32). The 2016 
target represented a significant policy shift, with the under-ambitious character of previous 
policy having been the subject of comment in previous research (Lovell, 2007; Raman and 
Shove, 2000; Smith, 2007). Sustainable homes in England had previously taken the form of 
„niche‟ developments (Smith, 2007). As ministers now recognised, achieving the 2016 target 
entailed a need for these niche developments to inform the „mainstreaming‟ of the delivery of 
sustainable homes.  
The previous research in the social sciences referred to above highlights the contested, 
technologically complex character of this policy issue. There is particular emphasis on the 
importance of the social purposes and locational contexts for the use of technology in 
                                                          
3
 Note also that the 2016 zero carbon target is applicable only to England owing to devolution of power to 
Northern Ireland, Scotland and Wales and it is beyond the scope of this study to cover the policies adopted by 
these three devolved regions. 
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understanding and evaluating processes of technological innovation (Lovell, 2004; Shove, 
1993; Smith, 2007). The significance of these factors, these authors argue, has been under-
estimated by government. The value-laden, often politicised nature of technological choices 
is emphasised (Lovell, 2007, p. 2505; Raman and Shove, 2000). However, the question of the 
effectiveness of policy for facilitating the transition sought in the house building industry is 
only briefly touched upon (e.g.Lovell, 2004, p. 43; Smith, 2007, p. 439). Some more recent 
research by economists and engineers does provide useful insights into the views of 
stakeholders about the zero carbon homes agenda (McManus et al., 2010; Osmani and 
O'Reilly, 2009). However, while this research highlights some key criticisms of current 
policy, the question of the lessons to be drawn from these criticisms for the design of 
governance and policy is not addressed. 
There are a range of different types of policy and assessment tool which might be used to 
facilitate the transition to zero carbon, including a carbon tax or emissions trading. However, 
CO2 emissions are just one of multiple criteria that require consideration in designing 
sustainable homes. Several of these, such as conserving scarce natural resources, biodiversity 
protection and aesthetic appearance, take the form of market externalities. Given this multi-
faceted nature of the policy problem, it can be questioned whether a single policy such as a 
carbon tax can, on its own be the solution. Indeed, in the case of a carbon tax, there are 
significant problems of implementation and enforcement, as well as the political challenge of 
gaining acceptance for the policy (Johansson, 2006; Victor, 2004, p. 86). Hence there is a 
need to evaluate regulatory strategies of the kind being developed by U.K. government, as a 
potential part of the solution.  
The analysis here considers how a wide cross-section of stakeholders frame this area of 
regulatory policy, including: central government, particularly the Departments of 
Communities and Local Government (CLG) and Energy and Climate Change (DECC); non-
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governmental organisations, notably WWF who have an active interest in this policy area; 
industry groups, e.g. U.K. Green Building Council (UKGBC), Sustainable Building 
Association (AECB), Good Homes Alliance (GHA) and private sector firms, including 
architects, engineers and sustainability consultancies. The sources for this research have been 
a wide range of policy documents and reports produced by stakeholders, professional and 
trade journals, supplemented by 38 semi-structured interviews conducted between March 
2009 and October 2010. The research focuses on the development of policy under Labour 
between December 2006 and the May 2010 election, with nine of the interviews being 
conducted after this period, between June and October 2010. The focus of the interviews was 
on identifying stakeholder views about the strengths and weaknesses of policy, including 
where they thought policy was having distortive effects. 
Policy background 
The UK government policy for the transition to low and zero carbon homes in the new build 
sector is widely agreed to have galvanised the building industry, encouraging the 
development of new technologies. However, since it was introduced in 2006 and 
subsequently developed, policy has been the subject of some significant, widespread criticism 
from practitioners. Many argue that current policy inhibits, rather than facilitates, their efforts 
to take what they consider to be the most sustainable design decisions. This has prompted 
much debate across the industry. With stakeholders on all sides of this debate showing a 
strong commitment to tackling climate change, it is evident that their framings of policy goals 
are crucially shaped by their views about the contested means for achieving them.  
The focus here is on policy for reducing CO2 emissions in new domestic buildings. Hence 
the focus is on reforms to the Energy section (Part L) of the building regulations and the 
related matter of the „zero carbon‟ definition. The research has also extended to cover 
reforms to the Standard Assessment Procedure (SAP), which is the methodology for 
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assessing the energy performance of domestic buildings as required for the building 
regulations. Also analysed are the energy and water sections of the Code for Sustainable 
Homes, a non-mandatory assessment tool launched just after the announcement of the 2016 
target, which assesses homes in terms of nine different categories of sustainability criteria. 
Homes are ranked according to one of six levels, each of which includes minimum energy 
and water efficiency standards. Many local planning authorities have used powers they were 
granted by Government to set target Code levels for social housing. 
The process through which the policy framework for sustainable housing has been developed 
is in several ways characteristic of the shift to „governance,‟ much discussed in political 
science (Stoker, 1998). Various types of stakeholder organisation, including industry groups, 
quasi and non-governmental organisations, offer insights for government officials and 
ministers into the implications of different policy measures.  These industry experts and 
representatives take part in a range of advisory groups organised by the Department for 
Communities and Local Government (DCLG), advising on the reforms of building 
regulations, the definition of zero carbon and the development of the Code. The Code and 
SAP, a tool for assessing the energy efficiency of new homes, have been developed and 
managed, under the direction of DCLG, by the now private company BRE, formerly the 
Government-funded research body known as the Building Research Establishment (BRE).  
In Part L of the building regulations, calculation of the minimum energy efficiency for a 
particular building, known as the „target emissions rate‟ (TER), is based on the performance 
of a hypothetical „notional‟ building of the same size and shape as the building being 
assessed. Part L requires that the estimated performance of the actual building, known as the 
Dwelling Emissions Rate (DER), is no higher than the TER. Both the TER and DER are 
calculated using the SAP model, which includes a number of assumptions about variables 
such as the climate, performance of particular building and energy technologies and the 
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number of occupants per dwelling. Because of this approach in Part L of measuring building 
energy efficiency relative to a target, the zero carbon target was also defined in relative terms, 
as a reduction in CO2 emissions relative to the 2006 TER used as a benchmark. The 
requirement was for net carbon emissions in the home over a year to be zero (DCLG, 2007a, 
p. 9), meaning that all energy used should be compensated for by the generation of energy 
from renewable sources. In addition to energy uses covered by the building regulations 
(heating etc), it was agreed, following the DCLG consultation on zero carbon, that energy use 
caused by cooking and appliances (referred to as „unregulated emissions‟) would be included 
in this calculation, which made the zero carbon target an especially ambitious one.  
As part of the requirements for achieving zero carbon, as depicted in the zero carbon pyramid 
(see Figure 1 below), the Government proposed that minimum standards would be set for 
both the energy efficiency of the building and the proportion of the zero carbon target to be 
met by renewable energy sources situated on the site of the building itself (or connected by a 
private wire). Emissions reductions beyond this carbon compliance standard, as represented 
by the top layer of the pyramid, could be achieved through a range of „allowable solutions‟, 
including „off site‟ measures. Examples of such allowable solutions, as outlined in the zero 
carbon consultation, include the use of, or investment in, renewable energy technologies 
which are not on-site, such as large scale wind or tidal energy sources, community heating, or 
the installation of energy efficient appliances and advanced energy control systems for 
buildings that encourage energy efficiency. 
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Figure 1: Defining zero carbon 
In order to indicate the trajectory and timescale of changes to the building regulations, the 
government defined two intermediate steps towards achieving zero carbon. The three stages 
defined correspond to minimum energy efficiency standards for achieving Code for 
Sustainable Homes Levels Three, Four and Six respectively. 
  
Allowable 
solutions
Other solutions for 
reducing CO2, including 
'off site' measures
Carbon compliance
Low carbon and renewable energy 
on the site of the home; connected 
heat sources
Energy efficiency
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Table 1: Towards the zero carbon target 
Year 2010 2013 2016 
Energy efficiency improvement (compared to 
2006 building regulations) 
25% 44% Zero 
carbon 
Equivalent energy standard in the Code for 
Sustainable Homes 
Level 
3  
Level 
4  
Level 6 
 
4. Coordination problems and the zero carbon agenda 
 
The Government‟s original definition of „zero carbon‟ was a very general one leaving open 
several questions which became the subject of significant debate across the building industry. 
As discussed below, there were some specific issues where stakeholders disagreed with the 
policy approach of Government. Unless stated otherwise, the views of stakeholders reported 
below are drawn from the interviews undertaken and seminars attended for this project. 
Stakeholder views about the zero carbon agenda point to areas where greater horizontal and 
vertical coordination are needed. Regarding „vertical integration‟ and policy implementation, 
concerns were expressed about the need for more support and training for building control 
officers responsible for ensuring compliance with Part L, as well as training for construction 
workers to address the „skills gap‟ which has been highlighted in relation to the challenge of 
delivering sustainable buildings (Royal Academy of Engineering, 2010).   
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The views of stakeholders also provide significant cause for questioning whether sufficient 
„horizontal coordination‟ between the policy for new homes and other related policy sectors 
has been achieved.  These concerned two different types of horizontal coordination. The first 
was whether policies in different policy sectors were implemented in a mutually consistent 
way. For example, some housing developers interviewed complained that they had been 
refused planning permission for the installation of on-site technologies such as solar thermal 
and photovoltaic panels. They had expected permission in these cases to be granted, given 
that such technologies were in their view of key importance for enabling them to meet 
renewable targets set by the local planning authority, including target Code levels, as well as 
being of integral importance for achieving carbon compliance standards within the zero 
carbon definition.  
Secondly, stakeholders frequently questioned whether objectives in each policy sector 
appropriately reflected the overall Government objectives of encouraging a transition to a low 
carbon economy in a way that maintains economic competitiveness. For example, a 
frequently made point during Labour‟s third term was that, in contrast with the high ambition 
of the 2016 target, the need to tackle CO2 emissions of the existing housing stock had been 
relatively neglected. It was often argued that there was a need to redress this balance because 
energy efficiency measures for the existing stock were a more cost effective way of achieving 
emissions reductions than the installation of on-site technologies. Equivalent arguments were 
also made about the potential CO2 savings that could be achieved by strategies for 
encouraging more sustainable patterns of consumer behaviour in sectors such as food and 
transport.
4
  
                                                          
4
 This perspective is evident, for example, in the ‘One Planet Living’ approach of the developer Bioregional 
Quintain (Desai and King, 2006). 
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However, a further set of concerns arose that do not all fall straightforwardly into categories 
of „horizontal‟ or „vertical‟ coordination between different levels or tiers of decision-making. 
As further discussed below, these concerns were about the way in which policies seek to 
achieve a balance between different evaluative criteria within as well as between particular 
areas of policy.  
Defining zero carbon 
The views of stakeholders suggest that several decisions concerning the definition of zero 
carbon have had distortive effects. Firstly, many stakeholders disagreed with decisions made 
concerning the chosen level for the first two layers of the zero carbon pyramid, especially 
relating to the carbon compliance level. This was a matter of considerable debate and 
sometimes controversy across the housing industry.
5
 Secondly, problems have arisen 
concerning whether to vary these standards for different types of dwelling. Thirdly, some 
stakeholders considered the way CO2 emissions of dwellings were measured as having 
further distortive effects. As is now discussed in more detail, the arguments expressed in 
these debates reflect different perspectives regarding the course on which to steer the market 
in order to achieve targets for reducing greenhouse gas emissions. These opinions reflect 
different views about the potential performance of different low and zero carbon energy and 
building technologies, often in the face of significant uncertainty, and how to balance 
emissions reductions targets with other sustainability criteria.  
  
                                                          
5
 Note that discussions about the definition of the top layer of the zero carbon pyramid, known as ‘allowable 
solutions,’ are not discussed here as no decision had been reached on this matter by May 2010. 
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Specifying minimum standards for zero carbon 
The level of carbon compliance 
The subject of the most widespread controversy across the industry was the question of the 
minimum level of on-site renewables for new homes, or the „carbon compliance‟ level as it 
came to be referred to. This issue was first addressed by Government in early 2007 when the 
Treasury (2007) published a zero carbon definition for the purposes of giving tax relief to 
zero carbon homes. This Treasury definition stipulated that only on-site renewables, or off-
site renewable solutions connected to the development by a private wire, would count 
towards achieving zero carbon. This equated to a carbon compliance level of „100% on site,‟ 
as advocated at the time by some key stakeholders including leading representatives of the 
U.K. Green Building Council, WWF and the architect Bill Dunster who designed the well-
known BedZed eco-housing development in Surrey, Southern England. These stakeholders 
emphasised the need for a tough regulatory standard to encourage innovation in on-site 
technologies.  
The goal of encouraging innovation needed to be balanced with feasibility and here different 
judgments were made about potential innovation in on-site renewables. As a previous 
government report had acknowledged (DCLG, 2007), generating all of the energy required in 
a home from such „on-site‟ renewables involves significant difficulties and costs, especially 
on sites such as urban infill where the space required for installing these technologies is often 
lacking. Interviewees with close involvement in the policy process explained that the „100% 
on site‟ definition was questioned and criticised by some industry advisers to Government 
before it was adopted by Housing Minister Yvette Cooper. They emphasised that off-site 
measures tend to be more cost-effective and suggested that a requirement for „100% on site‟ 
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would distort the choices of designers, steering industry away from the most promising 
technological paths for reducing emissions. As a 2008 U.K. Green Building Council report 
showed, this was a view that most house builders shared (UKGBC, 2008b, p. 31). 
The UKGBC report provided evidence that 80% of sites could not achieve „100% on-site‟ 
zero carbon because of the costs and practical difficulties of on-site renewables, particularly 
on small developments. As a result, the UKGBC departed from their previous position which 
supported 100% on-site. Their report concluded that “non private wire, near-site solutions” 
should count alongside on-site renewables towards achieving carbon compliance (UKGBC, 
2008a, p. 31). In December 2008, the government then launched a public consultation on the 
definition of zero carbon. Responses to the consultation were broadly favourable to the idea 
of including “allowable solutions” within the zero carbon definition. Only 11% of 
respondents supported a requirement of carbon compliance achieving 100% of CO2 
emissions reductions, with 43% of respondents favouring a 44% target and 46% favouring 
70% (UKGBC, 2008b, p. 11). 
Following this consultation, in July 2009, the Government proposed that the carbon 
compliance level be set at 70% of regulated energy use. Yet debate on the issue continued. 
Some practitioners with a role in policy discussions emphasised the lack of an evidence base 
to inform this policy decision. Developers and some consultants argued that 70%, in their 
experience, was still too challenging as a minimum standard on many sites, where off-site 
measures are more feasible and cost effective. Furthermore, this revision to the zero carbon 
target raised a further issue of coordination with the Code, given that Code Levels Five and 
Six continued to include a requirement for 100% carbon compliance
6
. The Code had 
originally been established as a tool that would anticipate and inform future regulatory 
                                                          
6
 Code level Five requires 100% reduction in regulated emissions, while level Six requires 100% reduction in 
both regulated and unregulated emissions. 
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standards. Some stakeholders therefore questioned whether a requirement for 100% on-site 
remained appropriate or desirable, given that there was now no prospect of this becoming 
incorporated into building regulations. 
The minimum energy efficiency standard 
The issue of balancing feasibility and innovation in the face of uncertainty also arose in 
debates about the fabric energy efficiency standard (FEES), the first layer of the zero carbon 
pyramid. To encourage innovation in building fabric products and design, the Hub working 
group on FEES sought to set the standard at a challenging level yet in a way that could be 
achieved by a variety of different technical solutions.
7
 One contested issue within the 
working group was whether FEES should be set so that to achieve the required level of air 
tightness would require installation of mechanical ventilation and heat recovery (MVHR) 
systems to provide sufficient ventilation. Negotiation on this issue, in the words of one 
interviewee, involved a “compromise” between advocates on the one hand of a tougher FEES 
standard and those who were sceptical about MVHR technologies and prefer natural 
ventilation. Advocates of a tougher standard included AECB who draw inspiration from the 
Passivhaus approach to building design, which originated in Germany and emphasises the 
importance of maximising the energy efficiency of the building fabric as a cornerstone for 
achieving CO2 emissions reductions. MVHR is a standard feature of Passivhaus buildings. 
By contrast, representatives of house builders within the task group highlighted what they 
saw as the dangers of a requirement to install MVHR. The home buying public, they argued, 
would not adequately understand such a system. As a result, they might not use the system 
properly, for example leaving windows open which interferes with the working of MVHR 
and can lead to a net increase in energy use in the home.  
                                                          
7
 Their report refers to their goal of striking this balance (Zero Carbon Hub, 2009, p. 11).  
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Measuring progress towards zero carbon 
A further issue that needed to be addressed by the Zero Carbon Hub working groups was 
whether to switch away from the current approach of measuring performance relative to the 
2006 Part L benchmark and to adopt an absolute measure of energy use. Some organisations 
with a close involvement in the policy process, such as the GHA and AECB, had long 
advocated a switch to the absolute approach. With the relative approach, they argued, it was 
more difficult for designers to keep track of the actual emissions of the building. With the 
focus being on achieving a specific TER as measured by SAP, there was, in their view, a 
danger of designers losing sight of actual building performance measured in terms of actual 
energy use. Where the SAP model was inaccurate, the relative approach was prone to 
creating distortive effects. An important case in point was the discovery that significant heat 
loss can occur through a „party wall‟ (a wall which divides two adjacent dwellings) (Lowe et 
al., 2007). SAP 2005 had assumed party wall heat loss to be zero. The significance of this 
issue meant that, if the 2006 building regulations minimum standard were to continue to be 
used as a benchmark for specifying emissions reductions in subsequent part L updates, it 
would have to be adjusted to take account of this issue. This, in turn, would compound the 
problem of understanding the standards, which were already viewed as being difficult to 
interpret. 
The general preference amongst experts for an absolute approach was reflected in the 
recommendation of the Zero Carbon Hub that FEES be expressed in terms of an absolute 
metric (Zero Carbon Hub, 2009). By this stage, Government had experienced the 
considerable problems involved in accommodating the discovery of the party wall issue 
within the current Part L framework and decided to adopt the Hub‟s recommendation. Some 
stakeholders felt that this switch to an absolute approach was long overdue. Yet it was 
suggested that the decision had not been taken sooner due to Government not wanting to be 
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seen to have changed direction. One civil servant interviewed highlighted the perceived 
difficulties that would have been involved in changing course, at an earlier stage, arguing that 
a switch to the absolute approach at the time the Code was introduced would have been a 
major change that could have caused the government to “lose” industry at a time when it was 
vital to gain their support for the transition to low and zero carbon housing. 
Varying emissions by dwelling type? 
A ‘flat’ or ‘aggregate’ approach? 
A further issue involved in specifying minimum standards for new homes concerns whether 
or not these could vary by dwelling type. The objective of this 2010 update to achieve 25% 
CO2 emissions reductions led to the question of whether to treat the 25% emissions 
reductions target for 2010 as an „aggregate‟ target, allowing the TER to vary by dwelling 
type, or whether to set a „flat‟ 25% target for all dwelling types (DCLG, 2009). A decision 
was made to adopt the flat approach, even though the aggregate approach was favoured by a 
significant majority of advisers to government. The aggregate approach, they argued, 
promised a more cost effective approach to reducing emissions, given that the costs of 
improving the energy efficiency of different types of dwelling can vary significantly. For 
example, the marginal cost of reducing the emissions from a large, detached house will tend 
to be lower than for an apartment in a large block where there is much less exposed wall area 
where efficiency improvements could be made. The „flat‟ approach, they pointed out, could 
therefore distort the choice of dwelling types that are built, creating an incentive to build 
detached houses rather than apartment blocks, even though apartments are an inherently more 
energy efficient form.  
In defence of his decision, the Housing Minister John Healey, interviewees for this project 
explained, argued that the flat approach would be more easily comprehensible for industry. 
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Government support for the flat approach appears to have influenced opinion amongst 
respondents to the consultation on the 2010 revisions to Part L, as a small majority favoured 
the flat approach. However, in response to this government view, expert advisers to 
Government argued that the additional complexity of the varying TER in the aggregate 
approach could be hidden from designers because it could automatically be calculated for 
them in design software. This argument did not sway the minister, whose decision was a 
significant cause of frustration to these advisors. With the Government having adopted the 
aggregate approach for non-domestic buildings, these critics also emphasised the need for 
more consistency in the zero carbon definition for domestic and non-domestic buildings, 
especially given that mixed use developments were becoming increasingly common. 
Defining the target for ‘off gas’ dwellings. 
It is more expensive for homes without access to the gas grid to achieve CO2 emissions 
reductions. A decision was therefore made to relax (i.e. increase) the TER for properties with 
electric heating, through the introduction of a „fuel factor‟ in Part L. This made it easier for 
them to achieve their target than it would otherwise be, although still more difficult than for 
dwellings with gas heating. A consequence of this was that, given that calculations for the 
energy section of the Code are also based on the DER/ TER methodology, dwellings that do 
have access to the gas grid  find it easier to achieve Code level 3 or 4 using electric rather 
than gas heating. Currently, the carbon intensity of the electric heating is higher than for gas 
and consequently it is possible for Code Three and Four homes to have higher CO2 emissions 
than homes not achieving this standard (May and Warm, 2008). (This became known as the 
„Code Four loophole‟). One motivation behind this adjustment to the fuel factor for the Code 
was to provide some protection for the manufacturers of electric heating systems, an 
important industry within the UK. However, the loophole is widely viewed as an anomaly by 
stakeholders, undermining the key policy objective of encouraging lower emissions. 
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Assessing the climate change impact of fuels 
Manufacturers of products and systems using electricity, such as electric heat pumps, 
mechanical ventilation systems and air-conditioning units were also influential in the choice 
of methodology for the calculation of the „emissions factors‟ in SAP which are intended to 
express the CO2 emissions caused by different fuels. This was another decision that required 
judgement about the future potential for technologies to achieve emissions reductions. For, as 
well as taking into account available data about direct and indirect emissions involved in the 
production and consumption of different fuels, the methodology includes a forecast of the 
likely carbon intensity of fuels in the coming five years.  
In discussions about whether to update this methodology for the 2009 version of SAP, these 
lobbyists argued strongly that the methodology chosen would need to take account of the 
potential for a future „greening of the grid,‟ through the increased use of low carbon sources 
of energy such as renewable technologies. However, as some interviewees point out, this goal 
of decarbonisation had been a longstanding one and with only limited progress having been 
made so far there are grounds for scepticism about how soon it will be achieved.  
The emissions factors for all fuels shown in the 2009 consultation were based on a revised 
version of the methodology used for SAP 2005 (Pout, 2009). This revised 2009 version took 
other greenhouse gases into account, such as nitrous oxide and methane, measured as CO2 
equivalents and incorporated a more consistent approach to calculating emissions, including 
„indirect‟ emissions.8 Using this 2009 methodology, the emissions factor for electricity was 
calculated to be 0.591kgCO2/kWh, compared with 0.422 kgCO2/kWh using SAP 2005. The 
main reason for this difference was that, since 2005, an increased proportion of electricity had 
                                                          
8
 A brief outline of the previous methodology is provided in (Pout, 2005) 
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been generated by burning coal due to an increase in the price of gas. A secondary factor was 
that a rapid decarbonisation of the grid projected in 2005 did not materialise. 
A majority of respondents to the SAP 2009 consultation expressed their support for the 
proposed 2009 revisions (BRE, 2009). However, electric heating industry interests were 
concerned that the increased emissions factor for electricity could potentially mean that 
electrical products would be significantly less attractive for designers in terms of their 
calculated CO2 emissions.
9
 Given that DECC‟s Chief Scientists encourage heat pump 
technology (MacKay, 2009), it is assumed that DECC would be concerned about the impact 
on heat pumps of higher carbon factors for electricity. This seems to have been the case as the 
DECC website indicates that the 2005 methodology has been used to inform SAP 2009 
(DECC, 2010).
10
 
Interactions between climate change mitigation and other sustainability criteria 
The analysis so far has concentrated on the distortive effects of the balance struck by policy 
between different ways of reducing CO2 emissions. However, stakeholders also expressed 
some significant concerns about how policy had addressed trade-offs between emissions 
reductions and other sustainability objectives. Again, these are not straightforwardly matters 
of horizontal coordination because they relate to trade-offs within specific policy sectors.  
This case study has not sought to give a complete analysis of these interactions between 
various sustainability criteria for housing. To give an illustrative case in point, the treatment 
of the inter-relationship between water and energy efficiency in the Code for Sustainable 
Homes has been the subject of considerable discussion. The Code provides credits for the 
                                                          
9
 The TER and DER methodology within Part L, which allows for variation in the fuel factor for electricity over 
time, meant that the impact of the higher emissions factor, from the point of view of achieving compliance 
with the building regulations, is nullified (Hughes, 2009).  This could change, however, if there was a move 
away from the notional building approach to measuring energy efficiency towards an absolute approach. 
10
 The factor for electricity in SAP 2009 is given as 0.517 kgCO2/kWh (BRE, 2010) 
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installation of grey water and rainwater recycling systems. However, a number of experts 
have argued that the energy cost of these systems can be higher than mains water (Grant, 
2008). Their opinion has received support from an Environment Agency report which found 
that most water recycling systems currently on the market entail higher energy use than mains 
water (Environment Agency, 2010). Stakeholders often emphasise that, in localities where 
there is no water scarcity, saving energy should take priority over water efficiency and in this 
respect the Code is having a „distortive effect‟.  
As well as depending on scientific findings, such as those of the Environment Agency, 
establishing whether policy impacts are „distortive‟ can also depend on the acceptability of 
technologies and their use by home occupants. Here, again, the effectiveness of water saving 
technologies and appliances is an important case in point. The Code also provides credits for 
the installation of water efficient appliances such as low flow taps and showers. However, 
some buyers of homes, particularly those of Code Level Three and above, have been reported 
as dissatisfied some of these appliances, replacing these appliances with much less efficient 
ones, such as „power showers‟ (Watters, 2010). Information about such post-occupancy 
behaviour is not captured by Code assessments which only take place at the time of purchase. 
Reflections on the effectiveness of policy in the face of complexity 
While stakeholders might take different views about the urgency and scale of the CO2 
emissions reductions required, much of the frustration about policy felt by many of them 
focuses on the various kinds of coordination problem discussed here. One interviewee 
criticised how policy is “not linking together different, complex trade-offs.” Another called 
for a fundamental reassessment of policy, echoing the calls across the industry for a more 
“holistic” approach. A third commented on the lack of integration between what is described 
as a “disparate” array of different policies. 
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Practitioners will of course typically have to comply with regulations, even where they view 
them as an obstacle to developing the designs they consider to be most sustainable. Some 
stakeholders regretfully comment that the design process can become a “tick box” exercise, 
particularly in achieving higher Code levels but potentially also in working to Part L 
requirements as they become increasingly stringent. By this they mean that a focus on 
achieving regulatory and Code requirements at the minimum cost can be at the expense of 
using professional judgement to consider the potential and actual impacts of their designs. 
Having said this, some stakeholders welcome the use of indicators such as those within the 
Code, as a way of encouraging designers to consider a wide range of sustainability criteria. 
Views about such indicators will of course depend on their perceived effectiveness in 
capturing progress towards the sustainability outcomes that are generally agreed to be sought, 
e.g. actual reductions in water and energy consumption. This is an issue which can involve 
both significant technical complexity as well as uncertainty about how technologies will be 
used by home occupants in practice. In this context, some stakeholders, such as AECB and 
the GHA express scepticism about the potential effectiveness of attempts to define targets. 
They instead favour a set of minimum energy and water standards and the AECB have 
developed their own set of such standards, which seek to be less prescriptive than the Code 
about the particular technologies and appliances that designers are required to install. Their 
standards assess building performance in absolute terms and are intended to avoid 
assumptions about occupant behaviour, as made by the Code water calculator (AECB, 2009) 
and the unintended consequences which these organisations see as arising from a target-based 
approach. The presence and use of non-mandatory assessment tools can of course influence 
policy development and the fact that AECB and PassivHaus standards already used an 
absolute measure of energy use could only have strengthened the case for adopting this 
approach for FEES.  
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5. Inevitable distortion? 
 
As argued above, Hayek‟s formulation of the coordination problem as essentially 
epistemological provides a useful analytical focus for research on governance and policy. 
However, identification of the distortive effects arising from coordination problems does not 
in itself support the Hayekian thesis that such effects are an inevitable result of governmental 
interventions in complex modern economies. It is beyond the scope of this paper to reflect in 
detail on the relative significance of the various causes of the problems with policy discussed 
here. However, we can note that the views of many stakeholders do suggest the significance 
of some causes which are specific to the U.K. institutional context within which these 
policies were developed. These include the following: 
 The lack of a strong evidence base on the performance of low and zero carbon 
technologies to support the design and delivery of policy.  
 The informal nature of the processes through which assessment tools such as SAP are 
updated and the limited scope of the information made publically available by BRE 
on which these updates are based. A couple of interviewees commented wryly that by 
far the most effective way of achieving a required change to SAP is to phone Brian 
Anderson, the head of the SAP team at BRE. 
 Some experts and industry representatives have reported favourably on how their 
views are listened to and appreciated by civil servants in both briefing and committee 
meetings. However, others felt that, on occasions, their concerns about policy impacts 
were “brushed aside” by civil servants. It was suggested that this was sometimes due 
to these officials lacking technical knowledge of the policy area, or lacking the 
incentive to report the issues to ministers.  
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 The policy decisions discussed above were each ultimately made at ministerial level. 
Several interviewees suggested that ministers lacked technical understanding, some 
commenting on this problem being exacerbated by the relatively short term nature of 
ministerial appointments (there were five Labour housing ministers from December 
2006).
 11
 As examples of ministers not responding appropriately to expert advice, 
interviewees with a direct involvement in the policy process referred to two key 
decisions: firstly, Yvette Cooper‟s 2007 decision to define zero carbon as 100% on-
site and John Healey‟s 2010 decision to adopt the aggregate approach for Part L (see 
Section 3 above).  
 Participants from industry on policy committees generally valued their opportunity to 
help shape policy. However, some commented that the discussion, particularly on 
policy strategy committees, involved a great deal of “lobbying” for particular industry 
interests, which could hinder attempts to make balanced assessments of evidence and 
its implications for policy. Participants in the Zero Carbon Hub working group 
meetings, which had an independent chair and on which Government only sat as 
observers, welcomed this as a different type of forum. They commented on how the 
wide range of parties involved had a shared interest in reaching a compromise set of 
recommendations as a way of making it less likely that Government will impose their 
own solution. Indeed the recommendations reached by the Hub on FEES reflected the 
widely held preferences for the standard to be measured in terms of absolute energy 
use and to vary according to the dwelling type. 
  
                                                          
11
 This issue is also highlighted by previous research by Government on the policy process. 
See (Cabinet Office, 1999, p. Section 4.2) 
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6. Conclusion 
 
Previous research on transitions towards a low carbon economy alludes to the problem of 
policy coordination facing governance systems but there is a need for an analytical approach 
giving a more explicit, detailed consideration of this challenge. As highlighted by the 
Hayekian thesis discussed here, the problem of policy coordination involves ensuring that the 
definition of policy reflects the balance of macro-level objectives being sought. Balance is 
required not just between policy sectors and tiers of responsibility (as highlighted by notions 
of horizontal and vertical integration) but also within specific policy areas where different 
sustainability criteria need to be balanced.  
This problem of the coordination of transitions involves complex trade-offs and choices, 
which are characterised by subjective judgment and significant uncertainty. Yet, although a 
quantitative survey of opinion has not been conducted here, this research suggests significant 
agreement about some key policy decisions having had distortive effects. The identification 
of such effects here, through a focus on the substantive content and perceived impacts of 
policy, prompts the further question of the causal factors which explain how these problems 
arose. In the case of the zero carbon agenda, industry experts and advisers to Government 
have played a significant role in highlighting key dimensions of coordinative challenges yet 
these have not, in the examples discussed here, been captured by policy, or at least not 
captured as quickly as some stakeholders think they might have been. This suggests a greater 
potential for the state to adopt a coordinative role in facilitating transitions through a 
regulatory strategy in the face of complexity than the Hayekian pro-market thesis posits.  
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